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 Title 
Fueling climate (in)action: How organizations engage in hegemonization to avoid 
transformational action on climate change 
Abstract 
This study examines how organizations avoid the urgent need for transformational action 
on climate change by engaging in a hegemonization process. To show how this unfolds, 
we draw from Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, focusing on the case of BP and its 
engagement with the climate change debate from 1990 to 2015. Our study takes a 
longitudinal approach to illustrate how BP defended its core business of producing and 
selling fossil fuel products by enacting three sequential hegemonization strategies. These 
included: adopting new signifiers; building ‘win-win’ relationships; and adapting nodal 
points. In doing so, we demonstrate how hegemonic construction enables organizations 
to both incorporate and evade various types of stakeholder critique, which, we argue, 
reproduces business-as-usual. Our study contributes to organization studies literature on 
hegemony by highlighting how the construction of hegemony operates accumulatively 
over an extended period of time. We also contribute more broadly to conversations around 
political contests and the natural environment by illustrating how the lack of effective 
climate responses is shaped by temporal dynamics.  
Keywords 
Climate change, hegemony, discourse, Laclau, BP, sustainability
 Climate change is considered one of the most pressing grand challenges facing humanity 
today (George, Howard-Grenville, Joshi, & Tihanyi, 2016). To ensure that the most 
devastating effects of climate change do not materialize, global leaders recently reached 
a long-overdue agreement during the Conference of Parties in Paris stressing the need to 
keep warming well below 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels (UNFCCC, 2015). To 
achieve this, transformational climate action is imperative. This involves making 
fundamental changes to energy systems in order to rapidly decarbonize all sectors of the 
economy before the end of the 21st century (IPCC, 2014). Organizations play a crucial 
role in realizing this goal. Large corporations in particular are often regarded both as 
powerful mechanisms for stemming climate change (Stern, 2007), and conversely as 
significant contributors to global carbon emissions (IEA, 2012). However, while some 
organizations have responded in productive ways by adopting carbon-mitigating business 
practices (Hoffman & Woody, 2013; Kolk & Pinkse, 2005), many others continue to fail 
or, worse even, actively avoid the need for transformational climate action (CDP, 2017; 
Wright & Nyberg, 2015). 
Scholars often suggest that the lack of effective responses to climate change 
derives from the way prevailing organizational processes, such as short-termism and risk 
evaluation, fail to internalize complexities posed by issues surrounding the natural 
environment (Slawinski, Pinkse, Busch, & Banerjee, 2017; Wright & Nyberg, 2017). 
Another perspective goes further to highlight how organizations engage in political 
struggles largely ‘outside’ the organization to ensure the continuation of business-as-
usual (Levy & Spicer, 2013; Nyberg, Wright, & Kirk, 2018; Wittneben, Okereke, 
 Banerjee, & Levy, 2012). In this regard, Gramsci’s (1971) concept of hegemony is 
commonly utilized to explore how powerful corporations strategically maintain a 
dominant ideology that downplays the need for radical climate solutions (Banerjee, 2012; 
Levy & Egan, 2003).  
Our study draws from this “neo-Gramscian” tradition. However, instead of 
following the more prevalent approach of conceptualizing hegemony as a static position 
maintained from the top down, we adopt a longitudinal, process-based perspective to 
consider how actors carefully craft hegemony as a bottom-up process. To do so, we draw 
from Laclau and Mouffe’s (2001) discourse theory of hegemony which explicitly 
foregrounds practices involved with hegemonization as an ongoing process (Nyberg et 
al., 2018; Spicer & Sewell, 2010). Laclau and Mouffe (2001) theorize how hegemony is 
constructed by piecing together a “chain of signification,” or the linguistic arrangement 
of various signifiers (i.e., words, terms or actions) linked together in a cohesive manner 
(van Bommel & Spicer, 2011). Hegemonization refers to this process of unifying, or 
temporarily “fixing” (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 8), different signifiers within a 
chain to produce an all-encompassing hegemonic discourse (Laclau, 1990).  
BP, one of the world’s largest oil and gas companies, is an exemplar case in this 
context. On the one hand, BP has been fervently active in the climate change debate since 
it famously broke ranks within the fossil fuel industry in 1997 by publicly recognizing 
climate change as a serious issue (Ansari, Wijen, & Gray, 2013). On the other hand, BP 
has failed to successfully shift towards producing alternative energy on a meaningful 
scale and instead continues to defend its core business—producing and selling fossil fuel 
 products—that, if left unchanged, in many ways advances dangerous climate change 
(Heede, 2014; McKibben, 2012). To demonstrate how BP engaged in hegemonization 
over a period of about two decades, we situate this case within a broader hegemonic 
struggle that includes resistant voices of environmental NGOs, media organizations, 
policy makers, and investor groups, among others. The primary source of data are texts 
that collectively represent BP’s attempts at hegemonic construction from 1997 to 2015. 
Specifically, we analyze BP’s “CEO-speak” about climate change (Amernic & Craig, 
2006) and newspaper articles about BP’s engagement with the natural environment. 
Our findings suggest that BP’s avoidance of transformational climate action was 
enabled by enacting a three-part hegemonization process. In doing so, we argue that BP 
was able to both evade and incorporate various forms of stakeholder critique regarding 
its approach to climate change. Our study makes two key contributions. First, we 
contribute to organization studies literature on hegemony (Banerjee, 2012; Levy & Egan, 
2003; Nyberg et al., 2018; van Bommel & Spicer, 2011) by demonstrating how 
hegemonic construction operates accumulatively, as a process that evolves based on 
(political) interaction between organizations attempting to (re)construct hegemony, and 
critiquing stakeholders. Second, we contribute to literature on organizational responses 
to climate change (Kolk & Pinkse, 2005; Slawinski et al., 2017; Wright & Nyberg, 2017) 
by adopting a longitudinal perspective to show how the lack of effective organizational 
action on climate change may be determined by organizations engaging in 
hegemonization processes. This furthermore highlights how certain temporal dynamics 
 enable organizations to swiftly respond to changing business environments and 
stakeholder critique.  
Organizational (in)action on climate change 
Much of the work addressing organizational responses to climate change takes a 
productive tone, emphasizing processes by which organizations become ‘greener’ 
(Hoffman, 2005; Kolk & Levy, 2001; Kolk & Pinkse, 2005; Kolk & van Tulder, 2010). 
However, given the general ineffectiveness of organizational responses to climate change 
on a global scale (CDP, 2017), scholars now also consider why organizations fail to act 
on climate change (Wright & Nyberg, 2015). Unfavorable market conditions deterring 
organizations from addressing climate change (Pinkse & Kolk, 2010), managerial 
processes related to short-termism (Lê, 2013), uncertainly avoidance (Slawinski et al., 
2017), and translating climate change into everyday business practice (Wright & Nyberg, 
2017) are all regarded as exemplar factors that discourage organizations from effective 
climate action.  
While these studies usually consider climate inaction as the outcome of 
organizations’ confinement to internal dynamics, another perspective highlights how 
some organizations maintain business-as-usual by engaging in broader political struggles 
(Banerjee, 2012; Levy & Kolk, 2002; Nyberg et al., 2018). Here, emphasis is placed on 
organizations’ strategic attempts to undermine environmental regulation, often in 
response to the threat climate change poses to fossil-fuel-based economies (Wittneben et 
al., 2012). In studying this type of organizational activity, researchers often draw from 
Gramsci’s (1971) notion of hegemony (Levy & Egan, 2003). 
 Theorizing the process of hegemonization 
As Gramsci (1971) theorized, hegemony concerns the way ruling classes are able to 
maintain power not through coercion but by gaining active consent of subordinate groups. 
This is achieved by constructing what is considered “common sense” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 
57) through a series of strategic accommodations that represent particular interests of 
different groups as part of a collective whole. These moves and counter-moves are aimed 
at forging links between groups with dissimilar interests and ideologies (Cox, 1983). For 
example, Nyberg, Spicer, and Wright (2013) illustrate how corporations in Australia built 
alliances with media actors, academics, and think-tanks to form common identities that 
legitimated market-based approaches to climate change. In doing so, a “historical bloc” 
of actors can be established (Gramsci, 1971, p.137) that enables groups with differing 
interests to ascribe to the same hegemonic project without necessarily forgoing their own 
interests. Although theories of hegemony are useful to explore, in particular, the relative 
stability of certain industries—and thereby the reproduction of business-as-usual—it is 
less useful for examining the processes by which hegemony is constructed from its 
origins. Here, Laclau and Mouffe’s (2001) post-structuralist retheorization of Gramsci’s 
work offers additional insight. 
Laclau and Mouffe (2001) adopt a discourse-based approach to the concept of 
hegemony (Willmott, 2005). A key aspect of Laclau and Mouffe’s theory is that 
hegemony presents itself as unifying diverse groups/interests through commonalities 
articulated by discursive practices (Nyberg, Spicer, & Wright, 2013). According to 
Laclau and Mouffe (2001), hegemonization predominantly involves the articulation of a 
 linguistic arrangement, referred to as a “signifying chain” (Spicer & Sewell, 2010; van 
Bommel & Spicer, 2011). This chain represents a manifestation of signifiers—i.e., units 
of meaning such as literal terms, actions, or actors—linked together in a coherent way to 
create a semblance of order. For example, Stavrakakis (1997) illustrates how signifiers 
including, amongst others, ‘sustainability,’ ‘social justice,’ ‘ecology,’ and 
‘decentralization,’ were forged together by environmentalist movements to construct a 
‘green ideology.’ Signifiers can thus be considered “building blocks” of hegemonic 
construction, so to speak, cobbled together through a process of articulation.  
Importantly, for hegemony to form, a signifying chain must be unified, or at least 
must appear so (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000). Signifiers within the chain cannot seem 
to be at odds with one another as this may result in a “fractured” (Nyberg et al., 2013) or 
“splintered” hegemony (Spicer & Böhm, 2007), which risks exposing a hegemonic 
project’s weak links. Instead, to create a sense of unity, one signifier—referred to as a 
“nodal point” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 112)—is emphasized to unite a chain (Laclau, 
2005, p. 70). As van Bommel and Spicer explain (2011, p. 1722), nodal points are “grand 
terms that bring together a series of more minor terms or themes, to provide some degree 
of temporary stability.” For example, the Slow Food movement created the nodal point 
“eco-gastronomy” by linking together several disparate signifiers such as “taste,” 
“slowness,” “artisanal,” amongst others (van Bommel & Spicer, 2011).  
Overall, these theorizations prove useful to understanding how organizations 
engage in political activity to maintain the continuation of business-as-usual in spite of 
the impending ecological crisis. However less is known about how organizations avoid 
 the need for transformational climate action by (re)constructing hegemony as a process 
over time. To address this, we engage in an analysis of BP’s discourses around climate 
change that draws upon Laclau and Mouffe’s processual understanding of hegemony, and 
pose the following question: how do organizations avoid the urgent need for 
transformational action on climate change by engaging in a hegemonization process over 
time? 
The study  
This study is centered on an “extreme” case: the relationship between one of the largest 
non-state-owned oil and gas companies – BP – and climate change. Based on a 
longitudinal analysis over two decades, we focus on how BP avoided making substantive 
changes to its business model by engaging in hegemonization, despite being seriously 
implicated by climate change given the nature of its core product (Heede, 2014). We 
begin our analysis in the late 1990s as this marks the point when BP first engaged with 
the climate change debate publicly (Ansari et al., 2013).  
Focusing on the fossil fuel industry is useful for the purpose of this study as 
companies such as BP have a “vested interest” (Wittneben et al., 2012, p. 1432) in 
avoiding the radical decarbonization of energy systems; after all, transformational climate 
action may significantly reduce the demand for fossil fuel products (CDP, 2016). Because 
of this, it is well evidenced that fossil fuel companies influence the climate change debate 
by engaging in corporate political activity usually intended to promote “business 
friendly” climate change approaches that do not threaten the status quo (Wright & 
Nyberg, 2015). BP has arguably been one of the most influential corporate voices 
 regarding climate change, both through its own public disclosures and as a political actor 
within the climate policy arena (Ansari et al., 2013; Kolk & Levy, 2001). However, 
though appearing progressive in terms of its approach to climate change relative to its 
peers (Kolk & Pinkse, 2005), BP has failed to reduce GHG emissions both from its own 
direct operationsi, and in terms of its indirect emissions – i.e., GHGs stemming from the 
consumption of its core product (Heede, 2014). Indeed, indirect emissions are vastly more 
significant—mainly given their scale—in the fight against climate change compared to 
BP’s direct emissions (Downie & Stubbs, 2013).  
Data sources and data analysis 
 
Our analytical framework is centered on organizational discourse analysis which 
involves exploring the patterns, structures and compositions of discourses, including their 
constitutive effects on organizational life (Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2004). 
Discourses are, simply put, structured collections of texts (written or spoken) that give 
meaning to social life through their production, dissemination and consumption (Maguire 
& Hardy, 2009). Although discourse analysis is applied in various ways, our approach 
draws largely from Laclau and Mouffe’s work given our theoretical interest in exploring 
hegemonization as a process. This approach allows us not only to trace the evolution of 
discourses over time, but also to foreground how these are articulated based on political 
struggles between actors attempting to stabilize, or temporarily “fix”, a discourse 
(Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000).  
We analyzed two sources of data as illustrated in Table 1. First, we analyzed BP’s 
CEO-speak (Amernic & Craig, 2006) – i.e., the CEO of BP’s public speeches and 
 statements, letters to stakeholders in sustainability reports, and media 
interviews/contributions (63 texts in total). These are important “texts that leave traces” 
(Phillips et al., 2004, p. 640) as CEOs convey strategic intent and outlook, and are often 
seen as the social face of the organization. CEO-speak of fossil fuel companies is 
particularly important regarding issues surrounding climate change as CEOs are tasked 
with publicly justifying their firms’ actions in light of the environmental impacts (e.g., 
Hoffman & Jennings, 2011). 
---Insert Table 1 here--- 
Second, we analyzed media articles that addressed BP’s involvement with climate 
change directly. This enabled us to trace how hegemonic struggles between BP and other 
key actors—e.g., environmental NGOs and investors groups—unfolded over time (e.g., 
MacKay & Munro, 2012; van Bommel & Spicer, 2011). Media articles are useful for 
analyzing hegemonic construction because of the media’s dual function as actively 
shaping the character of society and mirroring discursive struggles (Carragee, 1993). We 
analyzed 283 news articles amassed from a Factiva media database search of articles 
referencing BP in relation to climate change. We focused, in particular, on the Financial 
Times, Guardian, Wall Street Journal and New York Times given their extensive coverage 
of the climate change debate over the past 25 years both from European and American 
perspectives. These media are also ideologically diverse—i.e., center left (Guardian and 
New York Times) and more conservative (FT and WSJ)—and therefore reduce bias 
toward either side of the political spectrum (Carvalho, 2007). 
 We analyzed the data in four phases. The first involved immersing ourselves in 
the data to familiarize ourselves with BP’s narrative around climate change focusing both 
on media articles and CEO-speak. We then constructed an event timeline (van de Ven & 
Poole, 1995) to establish “who did what, and when” and “who said what, and when” 
(Maguire & Hardy, 2009, p. 153). We engaged in a close reading of the text and noted 
key events occurring each year regarding BP and climate change. These events were 
plotted on a timeline (see Figure 1).  
---Insert Figure 1 here--- 
During the second phase, we were specifically interested in identifying different 
discourses that emerged from the data (Phillips et al., 2004). To do so, we separately 
engaged in open coding of a random selection of 15 texts; at this point, we reached 
“theoretical saturation” – i.e., no new themes emerged from our analysis (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967). Our analysis involved using qualitative data analysis software, NVivo, to 
first identify each statement where BP’s CEO referred to climate change, or issues 
surrounding the natural environment more broadly. Thereafter, each statement was 
assigned a descriptive code – e.g., “[solutions] require the use of advanced technology in 
the form of improved manufacturing and separation processes [...]” received the code 
“technology.” This descriptive process produced around 100 first-order codes. We 
combined codes to form themes where we noticed significant overlap. For example, codes 
including “shareholder value,” “profit,” and “returns” were combined under the theme 
“profits.” We compared results and in cases where there were discrepancies, reordered 
 codes. Illustrated in Table 2, we eventually identified seven key themes: ‘climate 
science’; ‘sustainability’; ‘progress’; ‘technology’; ‘profits’; ‘markets’; and ‘policy’. 
---Insert Table 2 here--- 
During the open coding process, we both noticed that certain themes were more 
prevalent during certain time periods. This prompted a third phase of analysis in which 
we analyzed how BP’s climate change discourses evolved over time. As shown in Table 
3, we began by counting how often themes, including descriptive codes from the previous 
phase, featured in BP’s CEO-speak during each year of our study using NVivo’s word 
frequency analysis featureii. While this process provided us with a rough estimation of 
each theme’s salience within a given period of time, it did not account for the reasons 
why certain clusters of themes were more prevalent during certain periods (see darker 
shaded areas in Table 3).  
---Insert Table 3 here--- 
This led to the fourth phase of analysis in which we engaged with “temporal 
bracketing” (Langley 1999), analyzing how certain events and actions (from the event 
time line) prompted turning points in BP’s climate change narrative across time periods. 
Contrasting the previous phase, here we both analyzed the entire data corpus in 
chronological order using previously identified themes, coupled with the event timeline. 
Through this process, we discerned three periods (see Figure 1): The days of technology 
and progress (2000-2007); Back to shareholder basics period (2007-2012/13); and the 
Pushing governments for a carbon price period (2008/9-2015). Importantly, while 
transitions between periods are not strictly definitive as discourses often endure (Langley 
 1999), in some cases certain events (e.g., changes in CEO) triggered a noticeable change 
in BP’s climate change discourses. 
Until this point, our analysis was largely based on inductively identifying key 
themes and analyzing how BP’s climate change discourses evolved over time. What 
emerged strongly was that BP’s discourse surrounding climate change was an important 
mechanism employed to avoid transformational climate action; however, how they did 
this – i.e., the discursive practices they used – was not clear. Therefore, we turned to the 
literature where we came across the concept of hegemony similarly explaining the 
maintenance of business-as-usual in relation to climate change (Wittneben et al., 2012). 
Our emphasis on discourse resonated in particular with Laclau and Mouffe’s work, 
facilitating the discursive analysis of hegemonization. This also aligned with our 
longitudinal, process-based approach (Langley, Smallman, Tsoukas, & Van de Ven, 
2013). 
In this final stage of analysis, we followed a core tenet of Laclau and Mouffe’s 
discourse theory: that hegemonization means producing a sense of commonality – i.e., 
arresting the flow of differences to “fix” a discourse (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000). We 
therefore identified instances within the data where different themes (now considered 
signifiers based on Laclau and Mouffe’s work), events, or actors were linked to create 
positive associations, leading us to initially identify two strategies: adopting new 
signifiers and building ‘win-win’ relationships. For instance, we noticed BP established 
mutually beneficial working relationships with environmental NGOs; likewise, BP 
articulated positive associations between being a profitable oil company and protecting 
 the natural environment – both strategies were categorized under building ‘win-win’ 
relationships. We also noticed how, during each period, signifiers were combined and 
bundled together to form more abstract concepts; drawing from Laclau and Mouffe’s 
discourse theory, we consider these nodal points (techno-progress, shareholder wealth, 
and climate price policy) identified through thematic analysis of each time period and by 
corroborating our findings with the results of our frequency analysis (see Table 3). As 
nodal points often changed based either on BP’s evolving business environment, or 
emerging stakeholder critique, we identified a third strategy – adjusting nodal points. 
Findings – BP, climate change, and hegemonization  
This section illustrates how BP engaged in hegemonization by enacting three strategies: 
(1) adopting new signifiers upon entering the climate change debate; (2) building ‘win-
win’ relationships throughout; and (3) adjusting nodal points, forming three distinctive 
attempts each defined by a central nodal point.  
Adopting new signifiers  
By publicly recognizing climate change as a legitimate concern, BP adopted two 
signifiers: ‘climate science’ and ‘sustainability.’ As illustrated in Table 2, BP’s signifying 
chain thus contained seven signifiers, as John Browne’s (1997) famous “Stanford speech” 
evidences: (a) ‘climate science’; (b) ‘policy’; (c) ‘profits’; (d) ‘technology’; (e) 
‘sustainability’; (f) ‘markets’; and (g) ‘progress’: 
a) “There is now an effective consensus among the world's leading scientists 
and serious and well-informed people outside the scientific community that 
there is a discernible human influence on the climate [...]” 
 b) “We support that [policy]debate, and we're engaged in it, through the 
World Business Council on Sustainable Development, through the 
President's own Council here in the United States, and in the UK where the 
Government is committed to making significant progress on the subject 
[...]” 
c) “Real sustainability is about simultaneously being profitable and 
responding to the reality and the concerns of the world in which you operate 
[...]” 
d) “[solutions]require the use of advanced technology in the form of improved 
manufacturing and separation processes [...]” 
e) “Our overall goal is to do no harm or damage to the natural environment.” 
f) “[...] market based solutions are more likely to produce innovative and 
creative responses than an approach based on regulation alone [...]” 
g) “Actions which sought, at a stroke, drastically to restrict carbon emissions 
[…] would crash into the realities of economic growth. They would also be 
seen as discriminatory - above all in the developing world.” 
BP adopted these signifiers by engaging in different articulation practices. The first 
signifier—‘climate science’—was adopted relatively effortlessly by BP, given a 
longstanding emphasis on science; a cornerstone of the oil and gas industry. This signifier 
(‘climate science’) was thereby added to the existing signifier (‘science’) given a 
significant overlap between the two. To do so, BP needed to acknowledge the science 
behind climate change, or as Browne (1997) suggested: “[…] it would be unwise and 
potentially dangerous to ignore the mounting [scientific] concern. […] We in BP have 
reached that point.” Relatedly, BP distanced itself from climate science denialist 
organizations such as the Global Climate Coalition (Kolk & Levy, 2001) – a move 
welcomed by many environmental NGOs. As WWF suggested: “We hope this is the 
beginning of a realignment of industry” (in Boulton, 1996). 
 In contrast to ‘climate science,’ the signifier ‘sustainability’ posed a challenge; 
merely adjusting similar signifiers would not suffice to accommodate this new signifier. 
Instead, adopting the signifier ‘sustainability’ occurred by being framed as integral to 
BP’s approach to climate change through an extensive rebranding campaign. This 
involved morphing its 70-year-old logo, an iconic shield, into an emblem representing 
Helios, the sun god of ancient Greece (Barrionuevo, 2000). As BP (2001) explained: “[...] 
the new logo is intended to exemplify dynamic energy in all its forms, from oil and gas 
to solar.” BP’s rebranding efforts also related ‘sustainability’ to several core aspects of 
its business. For instance, ‘sustainability’ was closely aligned with BP’s business model, 
or as Browne (1999) put it: “I believe that if we’re going to meet the world's needs for 
energy, including oil and gas, we have to help resolve the risks of climate change.” As 
such, BP increasingly forged commonalities between its core business and ‘sustainability’ 
signifier, a move embodied by BP famously changing its initials from “British Petroleum” 
to “Beyond Petroleum” (Browne, 2002a). Overall, the main purpose of this initial strategy 
in terms of BP’s hegemonization process was to identify particular signifiers that posed 
a threat to BP’s relationship with the environment, and to incorporate these into its climate 
change discourse. 
Building ‘win-win’ relationships 
 
BP’s acquisition of ‘climate science’ and ‘sustainability’ coincided with constructing 
positive ‘win-win’ associations between different signifiers within its chain. While the 
previous strategy absorbed counter-hegemonic signifiers into BP’s climate change 
discourse, this step aimed to establish robust connections and build credibility among 
 these signifiers, and the rest of BP’s chain. To do so, BP somehow needed to demonstrate 
that these signifiers were mutually reinforcing. For example, BP linked ‘sustainability’ to 
‘profit’ by stressing that its financial performance and CSR efforts, which focused on 
environmental themes, could coexist: “I am conﬁdent of the ability and the commitment 
of the BP team to demonstrate that corporate social responsibility and outstanding 
competitive performance are mutually reinforcing characteristics of a great company” 
(Browne, 2001). Similarly, positive associations were also established between 
‘technology’ and ‘markets,’ or as Browne (1997) asserts: “Looking ahead it seems clear 
that the combination of markets and technology will shift the energy mix.”  
The practice of building ‘win-win’ relationships between signifiers featured 
extensively in BP’s marketing material at the time. For instance, an ad accompanying 
BP’s rebranding campaign proposed: “[is] it possible to drive a car and still have a clean 
environment. Can solar power become mainstream? Can business go further and be a 
force for good? We think so” (Trivedi, 2000). As indicated, “car” is reinforced by “clean 
environment;” likewise, “mainstream” and “solar,” and so on. It is conceivable that, 
without building ‘win-win’ relationships between signifiers, dissimilar signifiers would 
seem particularly disjointed; BP’s chain would lack cohesiveness. 
This particular strategy was not only evidenced by BP’s discursive moves; during 
this early period BP also forged ‘win-win’ relationships with NGOs. As Browne noted at 
Chatham House in London: “It is a mistake [...] to think that companies and NGOs are 
locked into an immutably hostile relationship [...] in some of the most complex areas in 
which we work, the progress we can make is dependent on the cooperation and skills of 
 NGOs” (Browne, 2002b). The types of alliances ranged from local level initiatives—e.g., 
partnering with WWF to address issues with oil exploration in the Indonesian rainforest 
(Garten, 2002)—to global programs, such as working with Environmental Defense Fund 
to implement BP’s internal emissions trading system (Cowell, 1998). A particularly 
notable development concerned BP “joining forces” with Greenpeace at a World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) organized event during the 
Johannesburg Earth Summit in 2002 to stress their shared commitment to stem climate 
change. A joint statement highlighted: “we are shelving our differences on other issues 
on this occasion” (Greenpeace, 2002). Although the WBCSD noted that differences 
between companies such as BP and Greenpeace remain—insisting that “this is not a 
merger” (Revkin, 2002)—the intimation of a potential common understanding on climate 
change arguably made disparities within BP’s signifying chain appear less incongruent. 
Nevertheless, despite BP engaging in these first two strategies, critique remained 
regarding the tension between BP’s purpose as an oil and gas company, and its efforts to 
address climate change. As an environmental activist remarked: “A few years ago, BP 
spent about US$200 million to rebrand the company as beyond petroleum [...]. But this 
rebranding did little for their green image; they are after all an oil company” (Greenpeace, 
2001). Indeed, although BP began strengthening links between different signifiers within 
its chain, at this point there was no single, inclusive force that could unify all signifiers. 
This, however, did not persist indefinitely as the oil and gas supermajor soon began 
emphasizing particular nodal points. 
 
 Adjusting nodal points 
Below we illustrate how BP, on three different occasions, created specific nodal points 
that each facilitated BP’s hegemonization process in slightly different ways. 
Attempt 1 – The days of technology and progress: During the early 2000s until 
approximately 2007, BP’s climate change discourse was dominated by references to the 
virtues of technology and human progress as indispensable for “the spread of prosperity” 
(Browne, 2004). As this became a general theme within BP’s CEO-speak during this early 
attempt, the ‘techno-progress’ nodal point emerged, the composition of which is 
exemplified in an interview with Browne (2002b):  
Energy is going to be the motor of growth for not just places like the United States 
or Europe, but also for the rest of the world that is not as well off as we are. [...] 
So we have to produce it and let people consume it in a way where they don’t take 
an unnecessary tradeoff against the environment. I believe that technology can do 
that for us. 
As demonstrated, Browne argues that “energy”, used as a metonym for oil and gas, is 
necessary to stimulate ‘progress’ (“motor of growth”), not only for industrialized nations 
(“United States or Europe”) but as a means to help impoverished nations (“the rest of the 
world that is not as well off as we are”). To achieve this, “technology” is hailed as a 
panacea. Here, the signifier ‘sustainability’ (“tradeoff against the environment”) is 
highlighted; thereby, nature is recast as something to control, measure, and manage in the 
name of human progress. This illustrates an important function of ‘techno-progress’ nodal 
point in BP’s hegemonization process; namely to redefine particular signifiers under a 
 universal meaning system, thereby potentially unifying BP’s chain. This function is also 
evidenced with other signifiers, such as ‘profit’: 
[...]only practical solutions would be ones which recognized the human desire for 
improved living standards. The answer came through efficiency and technology 
and through better management of the energy we use ourselves. That is the route 
to creating a sustainable, profitable business (Browne, 2002a). 
In this example, the signifiers ‘progress’ (“improved living standards”) and ‘technology’ 
(“efficiency and technology”) are reframed as preconditions for “creating a sustainable, 
profitable business.” In other words, the signifier ‘profit’ does not operate independently 
within BP’s chain, but is shaped by its relation to the universal techno-progress nodal 
point.  
The techno-progress nodal point became increasingly less prominent around 
2007, a shift that largely stemmed from a change in BP’s CEO. John Browne’s term as 
CEO of BP ended 17 months ahead of schedule in May 2007 due to a media scandal 
regarding his personal life (Cowell, 2007). Despite public statements that BP would not 
forgo Browne’s legacy, its new CEO, Tony Hayward, took a discernably different 
approach to climate change and “firmly distanced himself from his predecessor” (Crooks, 
2007). While Browne was often referred to as an industry “visionary” in terms of climate 
change (Herron, 2007), which may have contributed to BP’s grand techno-progress 
emphasis, Hayward’s plans for BP’s approach to climate change were more “practical” 
(Harding, 2007). 
 Attempt 2 – Back to shareholder basics: In line with BP’s change in CEO, a new 
period emerged during which BP primarily referenced climate change through an 
amalgamation of two signifiers – ‘profits’ and ‘markets’. The newly formed nodal point, 
‘shareholder wealth,’ is exemplified during a speech by Hayward (2009a) to Stanford 
Graduate School of Business: “We had too many people working to save the world, we 
sort of lost track of the fact that our primary purpose in life is to create value for our 
shareholders.” Clearly, times were changing – as Hayward insisted, “working to save the 
world,” reminiscent of the previous techno-progress era, distracted BP from its core 
purpose “to create value for my shareholders.” This move had significant implications for 
BP’s climate change strategy. For example, shortly after becoming CEO, Hayward 
controversially discontinued BPs strong stance not to invest in tar-sands, a move the 
Guardian newspaper critiqued: “BP’s decision last week to invest in the world’s dirtiest 
oil production in Canada’s tar sands indicates that Big Oil might be giving up its flirtation 
with renewables and going back to its roots” (Macalister, 2007). 
A key function of the ‘shareholder wealth’ nodal point was “getting BP back on 
the rails” (Hayward in Crooks, 2009 emphasis added) – i.e., from a hegemonization 
perspective, this was predominantly an attempt to align BP’s climate change strategy 
under the leadership of Tony Hayward, with its emerging climate change discourse. 
However, this strategy was not exclusively driven by a change in CEO, but also major 
shocks that seriously challenged the company as a whole, including the Deepwater 
Horizon accident in the Gulf of Mexico in which 11 people died (Hayward, 2010). BP 
was also increasingly financially constrained as global energy markets became volatile. 
 In 2009 the oil price dropped from $150 to $35 – largely due to the global financial crisis 
(IEA, 2012). BP cut 5000 jobs and began a $3bn cost-saving program (Crooks, 2008). 
Relatedly, its Alternative Energy Division’s budget was downsized from $1.4bn to 
$500m (Macalister, 2009). Vivian Cox, who led the Alternative Energy Division since its 
inception in 2004, resigned, stating: “It was now right to look at the array of options 
before us, and to step back and say ‘what can make commercial returns?’” (Teather, 
2009). 
While the above may have facilitated BP, or more accurately Tony Hayward, to 
articulate its new cash-strapped approach to climate change, the ‘shareholder wealth’ 
nodal point failed to produce a hegemonic discourse. A key reason concerns renewed 
critique significantly undermining BP’s sole focus on ‘shareholder wealth’ in relation to 
climate change. Each year, three reports that have attained Bible status in the energy 
business are published: BP’s Energy Outlook, the Annual Energy Outlook by the US 
Energy Information Administration (EIA), and the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) 
World Energy Outlook. In 2012, the IEA’s (2012, p. 25) Outlook report warned: “No 
more than one-third of proven reserves of fossil fuel can be consumed prior to 2050 if the 
world is to achieve the 2°C goal” (see also Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2011). Several 
investment banks published similar findings; HSBC for instance concluded that that 25% 
of BPs oil reserves could become ‘stranded’ (Spedding et al., 2013). As a result, some 
institutional investor groups inquired about how BP assesses financial risk related to 
climate change (Monbiot, 2012). BP responded with a statement tucked away in the final 
page of its Energy Outlook (2013): “[...] emissions remain well above the required path 
 to stabilise the concentration of greenhouse gases at the level recommended by scientists 
(450 ppm).” The significance of this statement cannot be emphasized enough – based on 
BP’s own “most likely” scenario, the world is heading toward an increase of 450 ppm. 
When cross-referenced with IPCC (2014) data, an increase of 450 ppm will see a global 
temperature rise of 4°C, which could have devastating consequences (World Bank, 2012, 
p. xiv). The irony here is that BP, to a certain degree, contributed to this critique. By 
prioritizing ‘shareholder wealth,’ investors became alarmed about the extent to which BP 
incorporated climate risks into their decision making. As a letter written by the US’s 
biggest state pension fund, addressed to BP’s executive committee, warned: “We cannot 
invest in a climate catastrophe” (in Crooks, 2013). 
Attempt 3 – Pushing governments for a carbon price: During this attempt, BP’s 
climate change discourse was strongly influenced by a blend of two signifiers, ‘policy’ 
and ‘markets’, which produced the nodal point ‘carbon price policy.’ The first noticeable 
development occurred around 2008 as BP increasingly emphasized the need to effectively 
price carbon: “The big missing link at present is a global carbon price–one that applies 
equally to all carbon, whether from a smokestack or a tailpipe” (Hayward, 2008). 
Crucially, BP’s emphasis on a carbon price was underpinned by the demand for 
government policy: “For the market to meet the world's growing demand for energy in a 
sustainable way, governments need to set a stable and enduring framework. Most 
importantly, they can and should establish a price for carbon” (Hayward, 2009b).  
Emphasizing state actors became increasingly pronounced during the 2009 United 
Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen. Before the conference, BP signed 
 the Copenhagen Communiqué, which acted as “a call from business for an ambitious, 
robust and equitable global deal on climate change” (CPSL, 2009). The central role of 
governments was paramount - while the Copenhagen Communiqué referenced the need 
for “robust global greenhouse gas emissions market”, it also stressed that governments 
should develop “additional policy measures, because a strong carbon price alone will not 
be enough” (CPSL, 2009, p. 5). The ‘carbon price policy’ nodal point was again 
pronounced ahead of the 2015 Climate Change Conference in Paris. A crescendo moment 
occurred a few months before the conference as BP and five other oil and gas companies 
(Shell, Total, Statoil, Eni and BG) formed the Oil and Gas Climate Initiative (OGCI). The 
industry coalition strongly advocated discourses reminiscent of the ‘carbon price policy’ 
nodal point: “we need governments across the world to provide us with clear, stable, long-
term, ambitious policy frameworks. We believe that a price on carbon should be a key 
element of these frameworks” (Elliott, 2015). Some environmental groups were even 
cautiously supportive of the OGCI’s statements; the Environmental Defense Fund (2015) 
for example stating: “The global oil and gas industry may not yet be playing to full 
potential, but they are now clearly in the climate game, and that deserves applause.” 
During this third period (2008/9-2015), BP’s climate change discourses—
centered around the ‘carbon price policy’ nodal point—visibly started to overlap with a 
wide variety of stakeholders. For example, several NGOs utilized the UN Climate Change 
Conference in Copenhagen as an opportunity to publicly voice their support for a global 
price on carbon (Meckling, 2011). WWF led the charge, co-authoring the Copenhagen 
Communiqué, also signed and promoted by BP and other oil companies including Shell. 
 Despite highlighting that effectively pricing carbon “is an important step,” the WWF, 
similar to BP, also warned of the need for government leadership: “we have to be cautious 
that individual action doesn't detract from what government still needs to do at 
Copenhagen and beyond” (Guardian, 2009). A comparable picture transpired several 
years later during the 2015 Climate Change Conference in Paris. Here, BP promoted the 
‘carbon price policy’ nodal point alongside environmental NGOs such as the Nature 
Conservancy, WWF, and Environmental Defense Fund as “strategic partners” of the 
newly formed Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition (2016). The support for a global 
carbon price was likewise echoed by various other stakeholders ranging from financial 
industry (e.g., BNP Paribas, 2016) to policy actors and multilateral institutions (e.g., 
World Bank, 2015).  
This way of coalescing around a specific discourse by a diverse set of actors—
particularly when organized through the formation of coalitions and alliances as 
illustrated above—alludes to establishing, to borrow Gramsci’s term, an emerging 
‘historical bloc’. In our case, this “climate regime” (Levy & Newell, 2005) operates under 
the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) and is composed of transnational climate governance actors – i.e., national 
governments, civil society actors, environmental NGOs, multinational corporations, and 
multilateral institutions. Hence, this third attempt facilitated BP to effectively 
hegemonize its climate change discourse by aligning this discourse with the dominant 
ideology of a historical bloc largely centered around carbon pricing. Of course, critique 
had not dissipated as dissident voices continued to challenge BP’s approach to climate 
 change, even long after this attempt (see Schifeling & Hoffman, 2017). However, more 
importantly, BP and many of its adversaries—all of whom belong to the same bloc—
increasingly propagate the same ideology, which has particular implications for BP’s 
avoidance of transformational climate action, as discussed next. 
Discussion and concluding thoughts 
We began this article by emphasizing how many organizations either fail to effectively 
respond to climate change, or actively avoid the urgent need for transformational action 
on climate change (CDP, 2016; Levy & Spicer, 2013; Slawinski et al., 2017; Wright & 
Nyberg, 2015, 2017). To better understand how and why this occurs, we focused on BP 
and its involvement with the climate change debate. Drawing from Laclau and Mouffe’s 
(2001) discourse theory (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000; Spicer & Böhm, 2007; van 
Bommel & Spicer, 2011), we demonstrated how BP, over a period of about two decades, 
engaged in an extensive hegemonization process. Based on these findings, we argue 
below that BP was able to avoid making substantive changes to its business model both 
by incorporating and rapidly evading stakeholder critique. 
Incorporating stakeholder critique 
Our findings suggest that BP avoided engaging in effective climate action by, during each 
stage of hegemonization, incorporating critique (Nyberg et al., 2013). Along with 
neutralizing immediate threats posed by critiquing stakeholders, incorporating critique 
obfuscated obvious tensions between being a fossil fuel company and concurrently 
engaging in environmental protection (Ferns, Amaeshi, & Lambert, 2017). Consider, for 
instance, how BP’s nodal points were abstract enough to mask certain tensions within 
 BP’s chain; for example, the ‘techno-progress’ nodal point linked together seemingly 
incongruent signifiers of progress (i.e., economic growth) and environmental 
sustainability. Indeed, as Wittneben et al (2012, p. 1436) suggests: “the deliberate breadth 
and vagueness of these [hegemonic] concepts glosses over contradictions and emphasizes 
a common interest in both sustainability and economic development in an attempt to 
create consensus among a diverse group of actors.” Obfuscating tensions without 
resolving them may contribute to organizational climate inaction. After all, as many 
sustainability scholars have suggested (Hahn, Pinkse, Preuss, & Figge, 2014; Van der Byl 
& Slawinski, 2015), visible contradictions, tensions, and conflicts stimulate 
organizational change as they “shape consciousness and action to change the present 
order” (Benson, 1977, p. 8).  
The practice of incorporating critique is well researched in organization studies 
of the natural environment, particularly discourse-related scholarship (Fleming & Jones, 
2013; Livesey, 2002b; Nyberg et al., 2013; Shamir, 2004; Tregidga, Milne, & Kearins, 
2014). Our longitudinal process-based perspective complements this work, illustrating 
how incorporating critique can be an accumulative process evolving over time between 
organizations attempting to (re)construct hegemony and their critiquing stakeholders. 
Indeed, as highlighted in our findings, each time BP enacted a hegemonization strategy 
and incorporated critique, its climate change discourse evolved. We evidenced how this 
occurred through three sequential hegemonization strategies: (1) counter-hegemonic 
threats are neutralized by incorporating new signifiers into a signifying chain – BP did so 
by acknowledging climate science and accepting the natural environment as a legitimate 
 concern; (2) thereafter, to strengthen links between newly acquired signifiers and build 
credibility for a signifying chain, ‘win-win’ relationships are reinforced among divergent 
signifiers and with dissident organizations – in BP’s case this included environmental 
NGOs; (3) and, finally, the arrangement of signifiers is adjusted in response to internal 
and external stakeholder demands; the resultant discourse thus fulfilling multiple 
stakeholder demands.  
As an outcome, we suggested that BP could form a hegemony by aligning its all-
encompassing climate change discourse (centered around a ‘carbon price policy’ nodal 
point) with the dominant ideology of market-friendly climate solutions (e.g., carbon 
pricing) as espoused by a historical bloc – i.e., the transnational climate governance 
regime (Banerjee, 2012; Levy & Newell, 2005; Newell, 2008). In doing so, the interests 
of multiple organizations become synchronized around a common understanding, or 
“discourse coalition” (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005), which mitigates contestation between 
constituents by claiming to represent the interests of all its members simultaneously. 
Moreover, being a member of this “club of carbon markets” (Keohane, Petsonk, & 
Hanafi, 2017) to a certain extent legitimates the lack of transformational climate 
responses given that the bloc’s emphasis on carbon pricing is far from transformational. 
Indeed, as a policy instrument, carbon pricing by itself offers “limited” potential for 
radical decarbonization of energy systems (IPCC, 2014, p. 28). Nevertheless, to reach 
this stage, each hegemonization step was arguably necessary to build upon the next. 
Without incorporating challenger discourses (step 1) and building win-win relationships 
(step 2), the signifying chain may well have been too fragmented to create nodal points. 
 In addition, the resulting discourse would arguably fail to produce a climate change 
discourse that is all-encompassing enough to represent multiple stakeholder views. But, 
how does the accumulative nature of incorporating critique more broadly inform our 
understanding of hegemonization as a process in organization studies? Here, we offer two 
key contributions. 
First, we contribute to the literature on hegemony in organization studies 
(Banerjee, 2012; Levy & Egan, 2003; Nyberg et al., 2018; Okereke, Bulkeley, & 
Schroeder, 2009; Wittneben et al., 2012) by adopting a process-based approach to 
illustrate how an organization engaged in constructing hegemonic discourse over an 
extended period of time from the “bottom up.” Surprisingly, with the exception of some 
studies of hegemony (e.g., Levy, Reinecke, & Manning, 2016), this “bottom up” 
perspective of hegemonic construction is largely overlooked; most studies consider 
hegemony as an inert state of domination rather than a continuously crafted structure 
embedded within rich historical contexts (e.g., Prasad & Elmes, 2005). By “bottom” we 
mean the historical point at which an organization radically altered its discursive practices 
in response to a serious threat – Laclau and Mouffe (2001) refer to this as a “period of 
dislocation.” By “up” we focus on the accumulative, step-by-step arrangement of 
signifying chain, which exposes both micro-linguistic practices of arranging signifiers 
within a chain (e.g., BP dropping the signifier ‘markets’ and adding ‘policy’ to create a 
new nodal point), and the evolution of this arrangement vis-à-vis broader changes in the 
organization’s ever-shifting environment. Future studies of hegemony would benefit 
from closely analyzing how hegemonic structures are constructed from their inception, 
 including the emergence of hegemony based on political struggles between organizations 
and multiple critiquing stakeholders over time. 
Second, our process-based perspective implicates literature regarding the 
construction and function of a historical bloc (Levy & Egan, 2003; Levy & Scully, 2007; 
Nyberg et al., 2013). Studies of hegemony often frame powerholders as dominant 
enforcers of an ideology – maintaining a hegemonic bloc from the top down in coalitions 
with other well-resourced elites (e.g., Banerjee, 2012). In contrast, dissidents and 
challenger actors are often caricaturized as willfully consenting subordinates with 
“limited [...] reach and efficacy” (Nyberg et al., 2018, p. 247). Our analysis, however, 
suggests more nuanced dynamics. For instance, apart from a certain exceptional instances 
(e.g., Browne’s Stanford speech and the rebranding of BP as Beyond Petroleum), an 
organization’s hegemonization activity may manifest as rather subtle – e.g., making 
minor tweaks to signifiers, briefly “sharing platforms” with a challenger organization 
(Greenpeace, 2002), signing a communiqué (CPSL, 2009), or joining a multi-stakeholder 
coalition (Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition, 2016). These seemingly inconspicuous 
activities accumulate over time to form a historical bloc (Cox, 1983) as our findings 
illustrate. Importantly, environmental NGOs—usually considered counter-hegemonic 
actors within the climate debate (Ansari et al., 2013)—may play a leading role in 
reproducing the very ideology of the organizations they critique (e.g., BP and WWF’s 
promoting of carbon pricing during climate summits). In this way, the threat posed by 
counter-hegemonic actors paradoxically emerges as a significant factor in maintaining 
hegemony (Okereke et al., 2009). Instead of simplifying the duality between power elites 
 and subordinate challengers, the construction of hegemony and by implication 
arrangement of a historical bloc can occur as a relational process between organizations 
and critiquing voices that mutually reinforce one another. 
Rapidly evading stakeholder demands 
Our findings further illustrated how an organization avoids making substantive changes 
to its business model in light of climate change by dodging counter-hegemonic attacks. 
We thereby contribute to literature on organizational responses to climate change 
(Hoffman, 2005; Kolk & Pinkse, 2005; Slawinski et al., 2017) by highlighting the 
importance of considering temporal dynamics involved with hegemonization, as 
organizational (in)action on climate change may be informed by rapidly evading various 
stakeholder critiques over an extended period of time. In our case, this involved 
continuously tweaking a signifying chain by engaging in a process of “creative, yet 
pragmatic bricolage” (Spicer & Sewell, 2010, p. 937). For instance, evading critique was 
noticeable when BP swiftly reorganized its chain after receiving criticism from several 
investor groups regarding the possibility of its fossil fuel assets becoming stranded 
(Spedding et al., 2013). Here, BP began to de-emphasize ‘shareholder wealth,’ instead 
prioritizing the nodal point ‘carbon price policy.’  
We suggest that discursive (hegemonic) construction is therefore an ephemeral 
process – seemingly impervious to critique. Consider for instance how other oil and gas 
companies, notably European supermajors (e.g., Shell and Total) often shift climate 
change discourses in line with stakeholder pressure (Livesey, 2002a). Interestingly, this 
 differs somewhat from North American counterparts (e.g., Exxon and Chevron), which 
have traditionally been more steadfast regarding climate strategies (Skjærseth & Skodvin, 
2018). Indeed, an organization’s national context (see Matten & Moon, 2014) may affect 
the malleability of hegemonic construction, which could be further explored. Moreover, 
other carbon-intensive industries subject to extreme stakeholder pressure regarding 
climate change, such as the coal industry, may similarly evade critique. Arguably, a key 
factor determining the ‘need for speed’ when sidestepping counter-hegemonic threats 
could be the public nature of a corporation’s engagement with a contested issue, including 
the severity of stakeholder claims – e.g., as stakeholders aim to stigmatize an organization 
(Devers, Dewett, Mishina, & Belsito, 2009). Therefore, organizations able to evade 
severe public scrutiny regarding climate change despite significant carbon footprints, e.g., 
the cement industry or state-owned fossil fuel companies (Heede, 2014), may not require 
a particularly ‘fluid’ hegemonization process. Hence, how processual dynamics—e.g., 
flow, speed, malleability, etc.—implicate the construction of hegemonic discourses over 
time (Langley et al., 2013) must be explored. After all, based on our findings, maintaining 
the dynamic flow of climate change discourses is important to evading counter-
hegemonic threats. 
These insights together have an important implication for how organizational 
studies literature conceptualizes ‘inaction’ on climate change, commonly defined as the 
failure of an organization to “reduce absolute [greenhouse gas] emissions due to a lack of 
effective measures” (Slawinski et al., 2017, p. 256). Inaction in this sense focuses on how 
organizations deal with immediate environmental impacts of their operations. Yet, as 
 highlighted here, this understanding is limited: while some organizations exhibit a state 
of inaction as per the definition above, they are by no means inactive regarding climate 
change. Instead, some organizations’ climate actions contradict the goal of keeping 
warming well below 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels (UNFCCC, 2015). Such ‘action’ 
may thereby reproduce business-as-usual as organizations downplay the need for 
transformative business models. 
We therefore propose that literature on organizational responses to climate change 
distinguish between “inaction on climate change” and what we term “ineffective action 
on climate change,” or organizational responses to climate change that actively hinder a 
rapid decarbonization of energy systems. Indeed, focusing on an organization’s (in)ability 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from its own operations only paints part of the climate 
change picture, as is the case with BP. This is especially important for organizations 
selling fossil fuel products, as they may engage in ineffective action on climate change 
due to threats of transformational climate action on their core business (CDP, 2016). 
Arguably, emphasizing the need for fossil fuel companies to reduce direct emissions (i.e. 
scope 1 emissions), distracts from more serious indirect emissions stemming from the 
end use of fossil fuel products (i.e. scope 3 emissions) (Downie & Stubbs, 2013).  
Future research  
This study presents several avenues for future research. First, although we used the 
‘extreme’ case of BP and its relationship to climate change, there are many other cases 
and companies that could be explored such as industries with similar or worse 
environmental impacts like coal manufacturing. There are also many silent cases that go 
 unnoticed such as the beef and international shipping industry that have escaped both 
public and academic inquiry (at least amongst organization scholars) despite relatively 
large environmental impacts. Examining these cases may yield fruitful insights regarding 
how different industries avoid transformational climate action. Additionally, as suggested 
previously, is possible that industries differ in ways they engage processes of 
hegemonization. This raises questions about whether certain industries are more (or less) 
capable of incorporating and/or evading critique. 
Second, this study foregrounded text as its main source of data, necessary here to 
trace how discursive arrangements evolved over time (Hardy & Phillips, 1999). However, 
due to this focus we could not analyze the production, consumption, and distribution of 
discourses in real time, examining text and talk in action. Future research could involve, 
for instance, attending CEO speeches or gaining access to board meetings. Regrettably, 
this is a difficult task with the fossil fuel industry given the sensitivity espoused by the 
industry regarding environmental issues. 
A third avenue for future research relates to extending theory on the affective 
dimension of hegemonization (Dey, Schneider, & Maier, 2016), outside the scope of this 
study given our discursive emphasis. However, micro-level studies could examine 
emotional dynamics evoked by hegemonization, especially useful to examining the 
human-nature relationship. Emphasizing affective dynamics would facilitate exploration 
of how resistance movements employ emotive symbols in their struggle against fossil 
fuel industries. Moreover, in response to our focus here on BP, future studies could 
demonstrate how hegemonization unfolds based on practices of environmentalist groups 
 and grassroots activists (Schifeling & Hoffman, 2017); a perspective largely absent from 
organizational theory regarding climate change. 
  
 References 
Amernic, J., & Craig, R. J. (2006). CEO speak: The language of corporate leadership. 
Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. 
Ansari, S., Wijen, F., & Gray, B. (2013). Constructing a climage change logic: An 
institutional perspective on the “Tragedy of the Commons.” Organization Science, 
24, 1014–1040. 
Banerjee, S. B. (2012). A climate for change? Critical reflections on the Durban United 
Nations Climate Change Conference. Organization Studies, 33, 1761–1786. 
Barrionuevo, A. (2000, July 25). BP is pushing: Beyond Petroleum. Wall Street Journal. 
Retrieved from https://tinyurl.com/y7cnfkm8 
Benson, J. K. (1977). Organizations: A dialectical view. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 22, 1–21. 
BNP Paribas. (2016, May 3). BNP Paribas commits to become “carbon neutral” by end-
2017. GlobeNewswire. Retrieved from http://tinyurl.com/y4zee8sr 
Boulton, L. (1996, October 22). BP explains why it quit global warming group. Financial 
Times. Retrieved from https://tinyurl.com/y8a5z7k7 
BP. (2001). BP launches in Los Angeles its new logo. Los Angeles, CA: BP PLC. 
Retrieved from https://tinyurl.com/y9kglq9m 
BP. (2013). Energy Outlook 2030 - BP Global. London: BP PLC. 
Browne, J. (1997). Climate change speech. Stanford, CA: Stanford University. 
Browne, J. (1999, September 9). John Browne speech at American Association of 
Petroleum Geologists conference. Birmingham. Retrieved from 
https://tinyurl.com/y9926hfh 
Browne, J. (2001). Environmental and social review. London. 
Browne, J. (2002a). Beyond Petroleum: Business and the Environment in the 21st 
Century. Stanford, CA: BP PLC. 
Browne, J. (2002b, March 11). BP’s CEO, Sir John Browne, talks about how the company 
reduced its greenhouse gas emissions. Minnesota Public Radio. Retrieved from 
 https://tinyurl.com/ya9757cp 
Browne, J. (2004). Powers and Responsibilities - the Role of Corporations in Human 
Progress. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Environmental Institute. 
Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition. (2016). CPLC Partners. Retrieved March 1, 2019, 
from https://www.carbonpricingleadership.org/partners 
Carbon Tracker Initiative. (2011). Unburnable carbon: Are the world’s financial markets 
carrying a carbon bubble? London. 
Carragee, K. M. (1993). A critical evaluation of debates examining the media hegemony 
thesis. Western Journal of Communication, 57, 330–348. 
Carvalho, A. (2007). Ideological cultures and media discourses on scientific knowledge: 
re-reading news on climate change. Public Understanding of Science, 16, 223–243. 
CDP. (2016). Out of the starting blocks: Tracking progress on corporate climate action. 
London, UK. Retrieved from https://b8f65cb373b1b7b15feb-
c70d8ead6ced550b4d987d7c03fcdd1d.ssl.cf3.rackcdn.com/cms/reports/documents
/000/001/228/original/CDP_Climate_Change_Report_2016.pdf?1485276095 
CDP. (2017). The Carbon Majors Database: CDP Carbon Majors Report 2017. London, 
UK. 
Cowell, A. (1998, September 18). British Petroleum Planning “Firm” Cuts in Emissions. 
New York Times. Retrieved from https://tinyurl.com/yc2am9xk 
Cowell, A. (2007, May 2). BP’s chief quits over revelations about private life. New York 
Times. Retrieved from https://tinyurl.com/ybz32t66 
Cox, R. W. (1983). Gramsci, hegemony and international relations: an essay in method. 
In R. W. Cox & T. Sinclair (Eds.), Approaches to World Order (pp. 124–143). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
CPSL. (2009). Copenhagen Communiqué. Cambridge. Retrieved from 
https://tinyurl.com/y7avgksr 
Crooks, E. (2007, November 9). Who’s who: Ten top powers to be reckoned with. 
Financial Times. Retrieved from https://tinyurl.com/y93wdwyh 
Crooks, E. (2008, February 5). BP to cut 5,000 jobs as profits fall. Financial Times. 
 Retrieved from https://tinyurl.com/y9xmep4y 
Crooks, E. (2009, July 7). Back to petroleum. Financial Times. Retrieved from 
https://tinyurl.com/ydb5z9d6 
Crooks, E. (2013, October 24). Investors warn moves to curb climate change will hit fuel 
demand. Financial Times. Retrieved from https://app.ft.com/content/28b61824-
3cb9-11e3-a8c4-00144feab7de 
Devers, C. E., Dewett, T., Mishina, Y., & Belsito, C. A. (2009). A general theory of 
organizational stigma. Organization Science, 20, 154–171. 
Dey, P., Schneider, H., & Maier, F. (2016). Intermediary organisations and the 
hegemonisation of social entrepreneurship: fantasmatic articulations, constitutive 
quiescences, and moments of indeterminacy. Organization Studies, 37, 1451–1472. 
Downie, J., & Stubbs, W. (2013). Evaluation of Australian companies’ scope 3 
greenhouse gas emissions assessments. Journal of Cleaner Production, 56, 156–
163. 
Dudley, B. (2015). Sustainability report. London: BP PLC. 
Dudley, B. (2017). Advancing the energy transition - Oil and Money conference. London: 
BP PLC. 
Elliott, L. (2015, February 17). BP: huge rise in energy demand at odds with climate 
change fight. Guardian. Retrieved from https://tinyurl.com/y9qqflll 
Environmental Defence Fund. (2015, November 7). Big Oil starts green Fund as Paris 
deal takes effect. The Oil Daily. Retrieved from http://tinyurl.com/y3fre29b 
Ferns, G., Amaeshi, K., & Lambert, A. (2017). Drilling their own graves: How the 
European oil and gas supermajors avoid sustainability tensions through 
mythmaking. Journal of Business Ethics. doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-017-
3733-x 
Fleming, P., & Jones, M. T. (2013). Introduction: Why the end of corporate social 
responsibility? In P. Fleming & M. T. Jones (Eds.), The End of Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Crisis and Critique (pp. 1–14). London, UK: SAGE Publications. 
Garten, J. E. (2002, October 11). Globalism without tears: A new social compact for 
CEOs. PWC Strategy+Business. Retrieved from https://tinyurl.com/ycs4ou54 
 George, G., Howard-Grenville, J., Joshi, A., & Tihanyi, L. (2016). Understanding and 
tackling societal grand challenges through management research. Academy of 
Management Journal, 59, 1880–1895. 
Glaser, B. G., & Strauss, A. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for 
qualitative research. Chicago, IL: Aldine. 
Gramsci, A. (1971). Selections from the prison notebooks. London: Lawrence and 
Wishart. 
Greenpeace. (2001). BP is “back to petroleum.” Retrieved May 29, 2017, from 
http://archive.is/oD1I#selection-893.21-893.29 
Greenpeace. (2002). Traditional adversaries call for action on climate change. 
Amsterdam: Greenpeace. Retrieved from https://docdro.id/t281WE4 
Guardian. (2009, September 8). Personal carbon trading: the next step in tackling carbon 
emissions? Guardian. Retrieved from https://tinyurl.com/yxs2suxp 
Hahn, T., Pinkse, J., Preuss, L., & Figge, F. (2014). Tensions in Corporate Sustainability: 
Towards an Integrative Framework. Journal of Business Ethics, 2, 297–316. 
Hajer, M., & Versteeg, W. (2005). A decade of discourse analysis of environmental 
politics: Achievements, challenges, perspectives. Journal of Environmental Policy 
& Planning, 7, 175–184. 
Harding, J. (2007, October 12). Chief putting the petroleum back into BP. Financial 
Times. Retrieved from https://tinyurl.com/yc8nwlud 
Hardy, C., & Phillips, N. (1999). No joking matter: Discursive struggle in the canadian 
refugee system. Organization Studies, 20, 1–24. 
Hayward, T. (2008). Energy pathways: Setting a course to a sustainable energy future - 
World Oil and Gas Assembly, Bangalore. Bangalore, India: BP PLC. Retrieved from 
http://docdro.id/JvUgJy4 
Hayward, T. (2009a). Entrepreneurial spirit needed. Stanford, CA: YouTube. Retrieved 
from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FwQM00clxgM 
Hayward, T. (2009b, October 23). Meeting the Energy Challenge - Oil and Money 
Conference. London: BP PLC. Retrieved from https://tinyurl.com/y7x2qdk7 
 Hayward, T. (2010). Opening statement to House of Commons Select Committee on 
Energy and Climate Change. London: BP PLC. 
Heede, R. (2014). Tracing anthropogenic carbon dioxide and methane emissions to fossil 
fuel and cement producers, 1854-2010. Climatic Change, 122, 229–241. 
Herron, J. (2007, January 15). On other fronts: Can an insider clean up BP? Wall Street 
Journal. Retrieved from https://tinyurl.com/ycamp56r 
Hoffman, A. J. (2005). Climate change strategy: the business logic behind voluntary 
greenhouse gas reductions. California Management Review, 47, 21–46. 
Hoffman, A. J., & Jennings, P. D. (2011). The BP oil spill as a cultural anomaly? 
Institutional context, conflict, and change. Journal of Management Inquiry, 20, 100–
112. 
Hoffman, A. J., & Woody, J. G. (2013). Climate change: what’s your business strategy? 
Memo to the ceo. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business Press. 
Howarth, D., & Stavrakakis, Y. (2000). Introducing discourse theory and political 
analysis. In D. Howarth, A. Norval, & Y. Stavrakakis (Eds.), Discourse Theory And 
Political Analysis (pp. 1–37). Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. 
IEA. (2012). World Energy Outlook 2012. Paris: International Energy Agency (IEA). 
Retrieved from http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/weo2012/ 
IPCC. (2014). Climate change 2014: Synthesis report. Geneva. 
Keohane, N., Petsonk, A., & Hanafi, A. (2017). Toward a club of carbon markets. 
Climatic Change, 144, 81–95. 
Kolk, A., & Levy, D. (2001). Winds of change: corporate strategy, climate change and 
oil multinationals. European Management Journal, 19, 501–509. 
Kolk, A., & Pinkse, J. (2005). Business responses to climate change: identifying emergent 
strategies. California Management Review, 47, 6–20. 
Kolk, A., & van Tulder, R. (2010). International business, corporate social responsibility 
and sustainable development. International Business Review, 19, 119–125. 
Laclau, E. (1990). New reflections on the revolution of our time. London: Verso. 
 Laclau, E. (2005). On populist reason. London: Verso. 
Laclau, E., & Mouffe, C. (2001). Hegemony and socialist strategy: Towards a radical 
democratic politics (Second). London: Verso. 
Langley, A., Smallman, C., Tsoukas, H., & Van de Ven, A. H. (2013). Process studies of 
change in organization and management: Unveiling temporality, activity and flow. 
Academy of Management Journal, 56, 1–13. 
Lê, J. K. (2013). How constructions of the future shape organizational responses: climate 
change and the Canadian oil sands . Organization, 20, 722–742. 
Levy, D., & Egan, D. (2003). A neo-gramscian approach to corporate political strategy: 
Conflict and accommodation in the climate change negotiations. Journal of 
Management Studies, 40, 803–829. 
Levy, D., & Kolk, A. (2002). Strategic responses to global climate change: conflicting 
pressures on multinationals in the oil industry. Business and Politics, 4, 275–300. 
Levy, D., & Newell, P. J. (2005). The business of global environmental governance. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Levy, D., Reinecke, J., & Manning, S. (2016). The political dynamics of sustainable 
coffee: contested value regimes and the transformation of sustainability. Journal of 
Management Studies, 53, 364–401. 
Levy, D., & Scully, M. (2007). =. Organization Studies, 28, 971–991. 
Levy, D., & Spicer, A. (2013). Contested imaginaries and the cultural political economy 
of climate change. Organization, 20, 659–678. 
Livesey, S. M. (2002a). Global Warming Wars: Rhetorical and Discourse Analytic 
Approaches to Exxonmobil’s Corporate Public Discourse. Journal of Business 
Communication, 39, 117–146. 
Livesey, S. M. (2002b). The discourse of the middle ground. Citzen Shell commits to 
sustainable development. Management Communication Quarterly, 15, 313–349. 
Macalister, T. (2007, December 11). Big Oil lets sun set on renewables. Guardian. 
Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/business/2007/dec/11/oil.bp 
Macalister, T. (2009, June 29). BP shuts alternative energy HQ. Guardian. Retrieved 
 from https://tinyurl.com/y86tc7pk 
MacKay, B., & Munro, I. (2012). Information warfare and new organizational 
landscapes: an inquiry into the exxonmobil-greenpeace dispute over climate change. 
Organization Studies, 33, 1507–1536. 
Maguire, S., & Hardy, C. (2009). Discourse and deinstitutionalization: The decline of 
DDT. Academy of Management Journal, 52, 148–178. 
Matten, D., & Moon, J. (2014). A conceptual framework for a comparative understanding 
of corporate Social responsibility. Academy of Management Review, 33, 404–424. 
McKibben, B. (2012, July 19). Global warming’s terrifying new math. Rolling Stone. 
Retrieved from http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/global-warmings-
terrifying-new-math-20120719 
Meckling, J. (2011). Carbon coalitions: Business, climate politics, and the rise of 
emissions trading. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Monbiot, G. (2012, June 22). Don’t cry for investors burned by BP. They were warned 
loud and clear. Guardian. Retrieved from https://tinyurl.com/ydzdkbxx 
Newell, P. (2008). The political economy of global environmental governance. Review of 
International Studies, 34, 507–529. 
Nyberg, D., Spicer, A., & Wright, C. (2013). Incorporating citizens: corporate political 
engagement with climate change in Australia. Organization, 20, 433–453. 
Nyberg, D., Wright, C., & Kirk, J. (2018). Dash for gas: Climate change and the scalar 
politics of fracking in the UK. British Journal of Management, 29, 235–251. 
Okereke, C., Bulkeley, H., & Schroeder, H. (2009). Conceptualizing climate governance 
beyond the international regime. Global Environmental Politics, 9, 58–78. 
Phillips, N., Lawrence, T. B., & Hardy, C. (2004). Discourse and institutions. Academy 
of Management Review, 29, 635–652. 
Pinkse, J., & Kolk, A. (2010). Challenges and trade-offs in corporate innovation for 
climate change. Business Strategy and the Environment, 19, 261–272. 
Prasad, P., & Elmes, M. (2005). In the name of the practical: Unearthing the hegemony 
of pragmatics in the discourse of environmental management. Journal of 
 Management Studies, 42, 845–867. 
Revkin, A. (2002, September 5). Small world after all. New York Times. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/05/world/small-world-after-all.html 
Schifeling, T., & Hoffman, A. J. (2017). Bill Mckibben’s influence on U.S. climate 
change discourse: Shifting field-level debates through radical flank effects. 
Organization & Environment. 
Shamir, R. (2004). The de-radicalization of corporate social responsibility. Critical 
Sociology, 30. 
Skjærseth, J. B., & Skodvin, T. (2018). Climate change and the oil industry: Common 
problem, varying strategies. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Slawinski, N., Pinkse, J., Busch, T., & Banerjee, S. B. (2017). The role of short-termism 
and uncertainty avoidance in organizational inaction on climate change. Business & 
Society, 56, 253–282. 
Spedding, P., Mehta, K., & Robins, N. (2013). Oil & carbon revisited - Value at risk from 
unburnable reserves. London: HSBC. 
Spicer, A., & Böhm, S. (2007). Moving management: theorizing struggles against the 
hegemony of management. Organization Studies, 28, 1–32. 
Spicer, A., & Sewell, G. (2010). From national service to global player: Transforming the 
organizational logic of a public broadcaster. Journal of Management Studies, 47, 
913–943. 
Stavrakakis, Y. (1997). Green ideology: A discursive reading. Journal of Political 
Ideologies, 2, 259–279. 
Stern, N. (2007). Stern review: The economics of climate change. Stern Review: The 
Economics of Climate Change. London: HM treasury. 
Teather, D. (2009, July 28). BP chief defends green energy record. Guardian. Retrieved 
from https://tinyurl.com/yd69h6uq 
Tregidga, H., Milne, M. J., & Kearins, K. (2014). (Re)presenting “sustainable 
organizations.” Accounting, Organizations and Society, 39, 477–494. 
Trivedi, K. (2000, July 25). BP Amoco wants to sell much more than gas at its new 
 stations. New York Times. Retrieved from https://tinyurl.com/yaxvnb2u 
UNFCCC. (2015). The Paris Agreement. Retrieved September 17, 2018, from 
https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement 
van Bommel, K., & Spicer, A. (2011). Hail the snail: hegemonic struggles in the slow 
food movement. Organization Studies, 32, 1717–1744. 
van de Ven, A. H., & Poole, M. S. (1995). Explaining development and change in 
organizations. Academy of Management Review, 20, 510–540. 
Van der Byl, C. A., & Slawinski, N. (2015). Embracing Tensions in Corporate 
Sustainability: A Review of Research From Win-Wins and Trade-Offs to Paradoxes 
and Beyond. Organization & Environment, 28, 54–79. 
Willmott, H. (2005). Theorizing contemporary control: Some post-structuralist responses 
to some critical realist questions. Organization, 12, 747–780. 
Wittneben, B. B. F., Okereke, C., Banerjee, S. B., & Levy, D. (2012). Climate change 
and the emergence of new organizational landscapes. Organization Studies, 33, 
1431–1450. 
World Bank. (2012). Turn down the heat: why a 4°C warmer world must be avoided. 
Washington, DC: World Bank Publications. 
World Bank. (2015). 5 Ways to Reduce the Drivers of Climate Change. Retrieved from 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2015/03/18/5-ways-reduce-drivers-
climate-change 
Wright, C., & Nyberg, D. (2015). Climate change, capitalism and corporations: 
processes of creative self-destruction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Wright, C., & Nyberg, D. (2017). An inconvenient truth: How organizations translate 
climate change into business as usual. Academy of Management Journal, 60, 1633–
1661. 
 Tables and figures 
Table 1 – Data corpus for BP’s CEO-speak from 1997-2015 
 
 
 
 
CEO letters Media articles Speeches  
CSR reports Guardian FT WSJ NYT Industry Policy Business University Total 
1997 - 7 11 1 1 - 2 - 1 23 
1998 1 1 2 3 1 1 - 1 2 12 
1999 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 - 11 
2000 1 2 3 2 1 2 - 1 - 12 
2001 1 2 2 3 1 - - - - 9 
2002 1 4 3 1 1 - 1 - 1 12 
2003 1 4 - - 1 - - 1 - 7 
2004 1 1 1 - 2 - - 1 1 7 
2005 1 1 3 6 1 2 3 - - 17 
2006 1 12 6 2 3 2 - - 2 28 
2007 1 10 7 3 1 1 - 1 - 24 
2008 1 9 6 3 1 2 - 1 1 24 
2009 1 9 4 2 1 4 - - 1 22 
2010 1 17 15 10 4 - 2 - 2 51 
2011 1 8 4 1 1 4 1 1 1 22 
2012 1 4 2 1 1 3 1 1 - 14 
2013 1 5 2 2 1 2 - - 2 15 
2014 1 5 4 1 1 3 - - - 15 
2015 1 13 14 5 4 2 - - - 39 
Total 18 116 92 47 28 29 11 9 14 364 
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 Table 2 – Signifiers, descriptive codes, and nodal points 
 
 
  
 
* Includes stemmed words (e.g., both science and scientific) 
** Taken from John Browne’s (1997) Stanford speech 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Signifiers  Descriptive codes* Illustrative quotes** 
Climate 
science 
Science; climate 
science; 
Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change; 
academic   
“Some of the detailed science on environmental 
issues such as climate change is imperfect and 
incomplete [...] but the fact that we don't know 
everything isn't a reason for ignoring the evidence 
which does exist” (Browne, 1998). 
Sustainability 
natural environment; 
nature; eco-system; 
wildlife, mother nature 
“ We’ve drawn up an exploration plan which has 
started with an Environmental Impact Assessment 
this year to ensure we don’t have unacceptable 
impacts on wildlife or the environment” (Dudley, 
2013b). 
Progress 
economic 
growth/development; 
human progress; 
civilization; prosperity; 
living standards. 
“To sustain supplies and meet the growing levels of 
demand that population growth and prosperity are 
generating we continue to invest for the future” 
(Browne, 2005). 
 Technology 
Technology; efﬁciency; 
innovation; engineering; 
“for us, the key question is which technologies will 
make the greatest contribution to meeting energy 
demand while providing BP with strong growth 
businesses” (Hayward, 2008). 
Profits 
Profit; financial; 
earning; revenues; 
shareholder 
“We believe we can help meet energy demand and 
create returns for investors by applying our 
distinctive skills, capabilities and technologies in 
these demanding areas” (Dudley, 2010). 
Markets 
Markets; trading; price; 
market-based solutions; 
tax 
“The very simple lesson is that emissions are 
reduced when the low carbon option is also the low 
cost option. The market is the most effective way to 
deliver a solution” (Dudley, 2013a). 
Policy 
Policy; government; 
UNFCCC; partnerships;  
“Climate change remains a major risk for the planet 
– yet one that competes for government attention 
with more immediate concerns over security and 
the economy” (Dudley, 2014). 
Nodal points Illustrative quotes 
 
Techno-
progress 
“Our role in society is to innovate, to 
apply knowledge and technology to 
problems and to turn them into 
opportunities. Business is not a passive 
force. Business is one of the most creative 
and progressive elements in society – 
providing the means and the choices 
which make human progress possible”. 
(Browne, 2004). 
Shareholder 
wealth 
“BP’s mission for 2011 and beyond is to 
grow value for our shareholders in a way 
that is safe and sustainable. We are also 
including a carbon price in new project 
development plans to encourage 
efﬁciency” (Dudley, 2010). 
Carbon price 
policy 
“As you probably know, BP has a 15 year 
record of calling for more action from 
governments, including the wide 
application of a carbon  price” (Dudley, 
2011). 
  
Table 3 – Frequencyii of signifiers within BP’s discursive arrangement 
 
  
 Climate science Sustainability Progress Technology Profits Markets Policy 
1997 0.13% 0.25% 0.19% 0.24% 0.20% 0.36% 0.39% 
1998 0.26% 0.36% 0.18% 0.20% 0.25% 0.11% 0.12% 
1999 0.09% 0.46% 0.20% 0.34% 0.42% 0.23% 0.32% 
2000 0.11% 0.08% 0.19% 0.28% 0.11% 0.31% 0.31% 
2001 0.00% 0.35% 0.36% 0.37% 0.25% 0.18% 0.18% 
2002 0.13% 0.15% 0.45% 0.33% 0.42% 0.35% 0.32% 
2003 0.19% 0.28% 0.47% 0.46% 0.33% 0.33% 0.20% 
2004 0.09% 0.14% 0.45% 0.44% 0.31% 0.36% 0.17% 
2005 0.25% 0.15% 0.50% 0.49% 0.40% 0.38% 0.36% 
2006 0.08% 0.10% 0.30% 0.31% 0.35% 0.44% 0.28% 
2007 0.09% 0.18% 0.25% 0.36% 0.36% 0.36% 0.36% 
2008 0.16% 0.21% 0.16% 0.35% 0.44% 0.50% 0.29% 
2009 0.03% 0.14% 0.15% 0.36% 0.49% 0.45% 0.47% 
2010 0.02% 0.07% 0.13% 0.33% 0.40% 0.44% 0.26% 
2011 0.03% 0.06% 0.22% 0.28% 0.48% 0.60% 0.28% 
2012 0.05% 0.05% 0.18% 0.26% 0.23% 0.40% 0.22% 
2013 0.05% 0.06% 0.18% 0.32% 0.19% 0.36% 0.40% 
2014 0.04% 0.05% 0.11% 0.28% 0.14% 0.37% 0.50% 
2015 0.14% 0.18% 0.10% 0.22% 0.07% 0.40% 0.58% 
Total 0.10% 0.17% 0.25% 0.32% 0.31% 0.36% 0.32% 
      
X < 0.30%  
      X ≥ 0.30%   
 X	≥ 0.40%   
 
 Appendix A - BP’s inaction on climate change 
 
 
Overall GHG emissions 
(Mte CO2 equivalent) 
Year on year change 
(Mte CO2 equivalent) 
Real sustainability 
reductions** 
(Mte CO2 equivalent) 
Total capital 
expenditure 
($ billion) 
Spend on 
renewables 
($ billion) 
2006 64.4*  
 
17.2 
 
2007 63.5 -0.9 20.6 
2008 61.4 -2.1 30.7 
2009 65 3.6 20.3 
2010 64.9 -0.1 23 
2011 61.8 -3.1 0.2 17.9 
2012 59.4 -2.4 0.2 23.2 
2013 50.3 -9.1 0.2 24.5 
2014 48.7 -1.6 0.1 22.8 
2015 49 0.3 0.1 18.7 
TOTAL 269.2*** -15.4*** 0.8 218.9 8.3**** 
 
* figures all from BP’s sustainability reports 
** term used by BP to account for deliberate climate change mitigation measures 
*** based on data from 2011-2015 for comparison 
**** see Macalister (2015) 
 
  
iAs illustrated Appendix A, BP’s overall investment into renewable energy, especially 
in contrast to its investments into non-renewables, is relatively small. From 2005-2015 BP 
invested approximately $8.3 billion in renewable technologies, which only equates to about 
3.8% of their total capital expenditures during this period ($219 billion). Recently, BP retracted 
most of its investment into renewables, and does not anticipate any major change in its 
investment strategy in the near future (Dudley, 2017). Furthermore, BP has not significantly 
reduced its greenhouse gas emissions. Although the company has reduced its overall GHG 
emissions by approximately 20% since 2006 (this is the first year BP began measuring GHG 
emissions from all its operations globally), the bulk of this reduction stems from what BP refers 
to as ‘operational changes’ (Dudley, 2015) – e.g., closing down a refinery due to poor financial, 
as opposed to environmental, performance. In contrast, changes in emissions from targeted 
efforts to improve environmental performance—BP calls these ‘real sustainable reductions’—
account for a miniscule proportion of the overall figure. For example, despite reducing its 
emissions by 9.1 megatons of CO2 in 2013, only 0.2% of this reduction can be attributed to 
‘real sustainable reductions’. 
ii ‘Frequency’ refers to the amount of times a specific term (or, in our case, a collection 
of terms) is identified relative to the total words within the text(s). 
                                               
